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Political Risk and Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The Case of the 
Nigerian Telecommunications Industry 
 
Executive Summary 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows are expected to be influenced by political risk factors. 
However, studies that evaluate the relationship between political risk and FDI flows in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) are scarce. This study examines the impact of political risk on FDI flows 
in a SSA context using the 12 political risk components published as the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) by the Political Risk Services Group (PRS) with the Nigerian 
telecommunications sector as a case study. The study finds that political risk has a significant 
influence on the inflow of FDI into developing economies in SSA such as Nigeria and that the 12 
components affect FDI in different ways. Irrespective of the political risk rating, a consistent 
improvement in composite political risk enhances FDI inflow. Among the 12 components, 
corruption, law and order, democratic accountability and investment profile were found to have 
significant influences on FDI inflow into the Nigerian telecommunications sector. Corruption, in 
particular, explains nearly two-thirds of the FDI inflow. 
 
Key Words: FDI, political risk, telecommunications, developing economies, Africa, Nigeria. 
 
Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been identified as a major contributing factor to the 
economic growth of developing nations (Osabutey & Debrah, 2012; Vijayakuma, Sridharan & 
Rao, 2009). Consequently, governments of developing nations such as those in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) continue to employ various policies and strategies aimed at attracting FDI into their 
economies (Mmieh & Owusu-Frimpong, 2004). The recent global economic downturn resulted 
in fierce competition among these nations to attract much needed FDI (Baek & Qian, 2011). The 
concept of FDI is underlined by Multinational Enterprises’ (MNEs) quest to improve their 
fortunes through the exploitation of opportunities abroad. They achieve this by establishing 
lasting business interest in the chosen host country (Dunning, 1979). These MNEs consider 
various variables before choosing investment location(s). These factors include economic, 
political, social, technological and legal variables. Strategic resources and capabilities of MNEs 
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influence how they are influenced by political events (Frynas and Mellali, 2003). One of the key 
considerations of MNEs prior to embarking on FDI is the expected impact of current and 
projected political situations in the prospective host nation(s) on business operations and 
performance, and the consequent effect on profitability of investments.  
A review of existing literature on political risk and FDI revealed that although there is an 
evident focus on developing economies there is paucity of existing published empirical work on 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Quantitative studies that focus on specific SSA countries 
or sectors are scarce as most of the existing empirical works are multi-country studies. Cleeve 
(2012), for example, studied political and institutional impediments to FDI inflows to SSA and 
used cross-sectional time series data to study 40 SSA countries. In a conceptual paper, Alon, 
Gurumoorthy, Mitchell and Steen (2006) emphasised the need for a framework for examining 
sector-specific micro-political risk. This clearly shows that there is a gap in the literature on how 
political risk influence sector-specific FDI inflow. Krifa-Schneider and Matei (2010) also studied 
political risk and FDI in developing economies using panel data from 33 developing and 
transition economies. Baek and Qian (2011) used the ICRG twelve political risk indicators to 
compare the impact of political risk on FDI between developing and developed countries using 
116 samples drawn from both markets. Unfortunately, none of these studies covered in-depth 
analysis that focuses on a particular country and/or specific sector such as the 
telecommunications sector considered in this study.  
Other noticeable gaps in the existing literature on the subject are the absence of studies 
that comprehensively covered the whole range of political risk components. Most studies looked 
at a few of the components with the most commonly studied components being democracy and 
corruption. Some of these works include Okafor, Ujah, Elkassabgi and Ajalie (2011) who studied 
democracy and FDI inflow in SSA. Asiedu (2006) also looked at the role of three political 
components – government policy, institutions and political instability on FDI in Africa.  This 
research paper studies, in considerable depth, a particular SSA country, Nigeria, and also uses all 
the 12-category political risk indicators compiled by the Political Risk Service Group (PRS) with 
the aim of identifying how each of the indicators could influence FDI inflow into a specific 
sector – the telecommunication industry.    
UNCTAD (2013) reported that although Africa had a 5% increase in FDI inflows in 2012, 
Nigeria witnessed decreasing inflows within the same period noting that Nigeria’s FDI inflows 
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fell from $8.9B in 2011 to $7.0B in 2012 as a result of political insecurity and the weak global 
economy. Political insecurity, a political risk, which has been prevalent in Nigeria, warrants 
attention in the international business literature. This downward trend affected the Nigerian 
telecommunications industry and data from the World Bank (2013) shows a declining FDI 
inflow since 2009, with 2011 alone witnessing a huge (51 per cent) drop in net FDI inflows into 
the sector from $3.03Billion in 2010 to $1.48Billion in 2011. This means that it is important and 
strategic to consider how much impact political risk influenced the FDI flows in the Nigerian 
telecommunications industry. This study focuses on the immediate post liberalization years as 
the literature has shown that FDI inflows into the industry stabilized in 2002 after the Nigerian 
Global System for Mobile (GSM) auction of 2001. This study will not include the year 2001 as 
the extraordinary one-off net inflow from the auction proceeds in that year could bias the entire 
data.  
Preliminary research has identified a number of indicators by which political risk is 
measured. Some of these indicators are: corruption, political stability, internal and external 
conflicts, ethnic and religious issues, socio-economic conditions, government policy and type of 
government (Aguiar, Auira-Conraria, Gulamhussen & Magalhaes, 2012; PRS, 2014). We 
investigate the relationship between these political risk components and FDI. The main objective 
of the study, therefore, will be to investigate the influence of political risk on FDI inflow to SSA 
using the case of the Nigerian telecommunications industry. This study seeks to use political risk 
components and net FDI inflow data to provide answers to the following research questions:  
 What is the impact of political risk on FDI inflow to developing economies?  
 Which political risk components influence sector-specific FDI inflow into Africa?   
 How do individual political risk components impact on the FDI inflow into the Nigerian 
telecommunications industry? 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, we review the theoretical and empirical 
literature on political risk and FDI. Second, we develop a contextual framework by giving 
insights into FDI inflow into the Nigerian telecommunications industry. Third, we discuss the 
adopted methodology and sources of data for this study. Fourth, we present and analyse the 
findings. Fifth, we conclude and discuss the implications of our findings and then set an agenda 
for future research. 
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Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review 
Political risks are influenced by institutional factors. Home country institutions, which facilitate 
or constrain firm performance, establish the basis for economic activities of firms (North, 1990). 
Institutions govern societal transactions in the areas of politics (e.g. corruption, transparency), 
law (e.g. regulatory regime) and society (e.g. ethical norms) (Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008). 
Peng et al. (2008) further note that institutional arrangements in developing countries differ 
significantly from developed countries. Political risks are institutional in nature; institutional 
weaknesses are prevalent in developing countries such as those in SSA. Freckleton, Wright and 
Craigwell (2012) find that lower levels of corruption (an institutional phenomenon) in 
developing countries augment the impact that FDI has on economic growth. Kwok and Tadesse 
(2006) also noted FDI’s potential of influence on corruption in host countries indicating that 
foreign firms could either enhance transparency or contribute to increased corruption. Several 
surveys on Africa related to the perception of investors conducted by organisations such as the 
World Bank, highlight corruption and political risk as major constraining factors to SSA’s FDI 
inflow. Barta, Kaufmann, and Stone (2003) offer a detailed explanation of the World Business 
Environment Survey (WBE), they suggest that corruption is the highest ranking constraint to FDI 
in SSA. UNCTAD (2000) also assert that corruption and political outlook significantly restrain 
FDI inflows. Although Asiedu (2006) found a negative relationship between FDI and corruption 
she points out that corruption leads to weak enforcement of the law and was indeed a barrier to 
the conduct of effective business. Also, contrary to expectations, Cleeve (2012) found that the 
relationship between FDI inflows and corruption was not significant in explaining the SSA’s FDI 
inflow.  
The findings from existing literature on the influence of political risk on FDI inflow are 
mixed. Some studies found that political risk discourages FDI (Dunning, 1998; Asiedu, 2006; 
Baek & Qian, 2011; Hayakawa, Kimura & Lee, 2011). Whilst others indicate that high political 
risk environments attract FDI (Janeba 2002; Dar-Hsin, Feng-Shun, & Chun-Da, 2005; Okafor et 
al., 2011). A third group found an insignificant relationship between political risk and FDI flow 
(Jadhav 2012; Wei, 2000). Additionally, others also argue that MNE home country political risk 
influence FDI location decisions (Sauvant, Maschek & McAllister, 2009 and Aguiar et al., 2012).  
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Negative Effect of Political Risk on FDI Inflow 
Most studies on the causal relationship between political risk and FDI arrived at the conclusion 
that high political risk discourages FDI in developing countries. Some of these studies are 
Asiedu (2006), Bussman (2010), and Amal, Tomio and Raboch (2010).  Amal et al. (2010), for 
example, found that in Latin America, a country’s political risk significantly affects its 
attractiveness to foreign investors. They argued that the reduced political risk in Latin America 
in the last two decades is responsible for the higher levels of FDI inflows. Baek and Qian (2011) 
studied 94 developing and 22 developed economies and discovered that host economies with 
high political risks discourage FDI inflow. This is because high political volatility results 
increased risk and therefore lower profits for foreign investors. Using the ICRG 12-component 
political risk index, they conclude that different political risk components affect FDI inflow to 
developing economies in different ways and that a stable political and policy environment 
encourages FDI inflows. Therefore, governments can attract FDI by promoting and maintaining 
a stable polity. Furthermore, and unsurprisingly, Asiedu’s (2006) study on the determinants of 
FDI inflow to Africa also arrived at the conclusion that an environment of high political risk is a 
deterrent to inflows.  Utilising panel data, from 1984 to 2002, for 22 countries in SSA, her study 
concluded that reduced corruption and political instability will enhance the flow of FDI into SSA. 
Asiedu (2006) observed that FDI to the region is driven by natural resources and suggested that 
smaller SSA countries with limited natural resources needed to improve their political and 
institutional infrastructure to attract much needed FDI.  
 
Positive Effect of Political Risk on FDI Inflow 
Some studies observed that conditions of high political risk in developing countries attract MNEs. 
Dar-Hsin, Feng-Shun, and Chun-Da (2005), Janeba (2002) and Asiedu and Lien (2011) suggest 
that there is a positive relationship between political instability and FDI inflow. Dar-Hsin et al. 
argued that some high political risks cause host country assets to be under-valued excessively to 
make them increasingly attractive to foreign investors. Janeba (2002) discovered that most high 
political risk environments become attractive FDI destinations because of low factor costs which 
serve as an acceptable risk trade off. This implies that foreign firms would be able to handle their 
operations in a cost effective manner, thereby reducing the cost of doing business and increasing 
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profitability. MNEs may focus their FDI on high political risk markets to avoid competition from 
most other MNEs, who may be cautious about investing in such risky markets. 
Okafor et al. (2011), and Li and Resnick (2003), in separate studies focusing on the 
impact of the democratic component of political risk on the inflow of FDI, arrived at the same 
conclusion; that observance of democratic principles by developing countries discourages MNEs 
from investing in the countries. Okafor et al.’s (2011) study which focused on SSA discovered 
that the volume of FDI inflow to SSA declines as these countries progress to stronger and more 
proficient democracies. Arguably, these results could have been influenced by the dominance of 
investments from emerging markets who exploit the absence of democratic principles. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that Li and Resnick (2003) also observed that MNEs prefer to invest in 
developing countries with autocratic or totalitarian governments. Noting that, unlike democratic 
governments, autocratic governments are not answerable to their people and so can offer better 
incentives and protection from labour unions to the MNEs.  
 
Insignificant Relationship between Political Risk and FDI Inflow 
As indicated earlier, some other findings such as Asiedu (2002) and Noorbakhsh, Polani, and 
Youssef (2001) indicate an insignificant relationship between political risk and FDI inflow. Both 
strands of research appear to argue that political risk does not necessarily or significantly 
influence MNEs FDI location decisions. A report by the Economic Intelligence Unit, EIU (2007) 
observed that high political risk does not deter FDI. The report stated that, contrary to popular 
thinking, foreign investors’ location decisions focus on macro-conditions rather than political 
risk. This suggests that it is the overall business environment in a country that primarily 
influences MNEs location decisions. The EIU (2007) noted that MNEs now mitigate political 
risk through sophisticated strategies and insurance schemes, thereby reducing the contribution of 
political risk factors to their location decision making process. MNEs use the political risk 
forecasts to buy insurance to moderate the potential political risk deciding where to invest.  
 
Telecommunication FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
Madichie (2011) observed that the telecommunications industry in SSA is experiencing 
tremendous growth, driven by FDI originating mostly from the Middle East and South Africa. 
He identified the key drivers of this growth as Kuwaiti based Zain (formerly Celtel), Etisalat of 
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United Arab Emirates and MTN of South Africa. Madichie (2011) noted that Africa currently 
has the highest annual growth rate in mobile telephone subscription across the world. In their 
study on the developmental impact of FDI on SSA, Ndikumana and Verick (2008) attributed 
MNEs interests in the SSA’s telecommunications industry to the fact that the industry is 
underdeveloped in the region and therefore presents investors with huge markets and profit 
opportunities. In addition, Djiofack-Zebaze and Keck (2009), in their study using a sample of 45 
SSA countries, found that foreign participation in various sectors is increasing because most SSA 
countries were opening up their economies through liberalization. 
   
FDI in the Nigerian Telecommunication Industry 
The Nigerian telecommunications industry started attracting significant MNE interests when it 
was liberalized in 2001. This industry is of interest because of the high volume of FDI it is 
currently attracting. The telecommunications industry is currently Nigeria’s second most 
important beneficiary of FDI after the extractive oil industry (Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, 2013). 
Another interesting statistic of the Nigerian telecoms industry is the origin of the FDI in the 
industry. According to the National Communications Commission (NCC, 2013), over 90 per 
cent of the FDI stocks in the industry originate from other developing economies. This implies 
that whilst MNEs from developed economies may appear to be reluctant to invest in the sector, 
MNEs from developing countries seize the opportunity. This is leading to the increasing trend of 
some emerging economies becoming major FDI players in other developing countries.  
This study will focus on the ten year period between 2002 and 2011. The base year 2002 
is chosen because of the significance of the year in the history of FDI in the Nigerian 
telecommunications industry and year 2011 chosen as the end year as the latest available data on 
the FDI flows in both World Bank and Nigeria Bureau of Statistics databases was that of 2011. 
Year 2002 is the year immediately after the liberalization of the telecommunications industry in 
Nigeria. Following the re-introduction of civilian democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, the new 
civilian administration decided to liberalize the government controlled telecommunications 
industry. This led to the auctioning of Global System for Mobile (GSM) licences in 2001. Two 
of the three licenses were won by multinational telecommunications companies – South African 
based MTN and Econet Wireless of Zimbabwe. Payment for the licenses, which cost $285 
million each, ushered in a new phase of foreign investments into the Nigerian 
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telecommunications industry. Prior to the auction, over 85 per cent of the industry was controlled 
by the government owned Nigerian Telecommunications Limited (Nitel) (NCC, 2013). The 
auction year (2001) witnessed an unprecedented net FDI inflow totalling $970 million and 
representing 1181.37 per cent increase over the previous year (2000) net inflows of $75.7 million 
(Nigeria Bureau of Statistics, 2013). 
Nigerian Telecommunications Ltd (Nitel) monopoly was broken up in 2001 when the 
Nigerian government liberalized the telecommunications industry by the introduction of GSM 
technology through the offering of three licenses by competitive bidding. According to the NCC 
(2013), the Nigerian telecommunications sphere is dominated by mobile telecommunications 
technology. Mobile telecommunications currently account for 99.67 per cent of all telephone 
facilities in the country with GSM technology dominating with over 97 per cent. The share of 
fixed (wired/wireless) is a negligible 0.33 per cent as shown in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1: Nigerian Market Share by Telecommunications Technology (June 2013)   
Telecommunications Technology Percentage Market Share 
Mobile (GSM) 97.47% 
Mobile (CDMA) 2.20% 
Fixed (Wired/Wireless) 0.33% 
Source: NCC (2013) 
 
TABLE 2: Nigerian Mobile Telecommunications Market Share by Operators (June 2013) 
Operator  Number of Subscribers Percentage Market Share 
MTN 55,238,430 47.05% 
Globacom 25,019,862 21.31% 
Airtel 21,591,904 18.39% 
Etisalat 15,303,647 13.04% 
MTel 258,520 0.002% 
TOTAL 117,412,363  
Source: NCC (2013) 
 
Table 2 indicates that the highly competitive Nigerian mobile telecommunication market is 
currently dominated by four firms – South Africa based MTN, Globacom Ltd (Nigeria), Bharti 
Airtel of India and Etisalat owned by Emerging Market Telecom Services (EMTS) of UAE; 
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together they account for around 99 per cent of the Nigerian mobile market. This demonstrates 
the prevalence of FDI in the Nigerian mobile telecommunications, as three of the four dominant 
firms are foreign MNEs. Madichie (2011) discovered that the major determinants of FDI inflow 
into the Nigerian telecommunications sector are the huge market opportunities for investment 
and the high-entry and product-research costs which is a major hindrance to domestic players. 
Madichie’s (2011) assessment of Middle Eastern firms’ telecommunications investments in SSA 
relied on qualitative case studies of three emerging market telecom operators in Nigeria: Zain 
(Middle East), Etisalat (Middle East) and MTN (South Africa). Oji-Okoro (2011) observed that 
telecommunications FDI have completely transformed the industry and has contributed to 
Nigeria having the highest tele-density in Africa. This trend has also driven prices below those in 
comparator countries. This high impact, since liberalization in 2001, could be ascribed to the 
large market size of the country (NCC, 2013).  
It is also worth noting that the sources of FDI flow into the Nigerian telecommunications 
industry indicate that the ‘psychic distance’ postulation of Johansson and Vahlne’s (1977) 
Uppsala Model of internationalization remains relevant today. All key FDI players in the 
industry are MNEs from other developing countries – MTN from South Africa, Airtel from India 
and Etisalat from the United Arab Emirates, together they control 79 per cent of the Nigerian 
telecommunications market (see Table 2). These developing countries share similar political and 
institutional structures with Nigeria and thus lesser ‘psychic distance’. Previous studies affirm 
that developing countries generally pose higher levels of political risks than developed countries 
(Jensen, 2008; UNCTAD, 2013) and that these developing countries view political risk in much 
the same way (Sauvant et al., 2009 and Aguiar et al., 2012).  
 
Methodology and Sources of Data 
As a result of the longitudinal nature of this research paper, time series data from 2002 to 2011 
was used. FDI inflow data was sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator 
and the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics websites. Political risk data was sourced from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by the Political Risk Service (PRS) Group. 
The ICRG uses 12 risk components to measure political risk of a country or region. These 
components, as shown in Table 3, are Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, 
Investment Profile, Internal Conflict, External Conflict, Corruption, Military in Politics, 
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Religious Tensions, Law and Order, Ethnic Tensions, Democratic Accountability, and 
Bureaucracy Quality. The ICRG also makes available political information on which the ratings 
are based. This allows users to interrogate the data to assess their ratings against other rating 
systems for validity and authenticity. Baek and Qian (2011) referred to the ICRG 12-category 
political risk index as the most comprehensive measure of political risk and noted that it has the 
advantage of being directly relevant for foreign investors.  The ICRG index has been used to 
measure political risk in both developed and developing economies by studies such as Asiedu 
(2006), Howell (2007), Busse and Hefeker (2007) and Hayakawa et al. (2011). The ICRG ratings 
are also generally used by MNEs, importers and exporters, institutional investors and foreign 
exchange traders (Hayakawa et al., 2011).  
  
TABLE 3 ICRG Political Risk Components and Weight 
 Component      Maximum Points/Weight 
1 Government Stability       12 
2 Socioeconomic Conditions      12 
3 Investment Profile       12 
4 Internal Conflict       12 
5 External Conflict       12 
6 Corruption        6 
7 Military in Politics       6 
8 Religious Tensions       6 
9 Law and Order       6 
10 Ethnic Tensions       6 
11 Democratic Accountability      6 
12 Bureaucracy Quality       4 
TOTAL         100 
Source: PRS (2014) 
 
The ICRG model was created in 1980 by the editors of International Reports, an international 
newsletter. In 1992, the ICRG became part of the PRS Group when its editors and analysts 
moved from International Reports to The PRS Group. To arrive at the ICRG political risk index, 
political information based on the evaluation and subjective analysis of consistent patterns are 
converted into risk points for individual risk components. Individual components are often drawn 
from an aggregate of subcomponents. Components are assigned numerical values (risk points). 
The minimum number of points that can be assigned to each component is zero while the 
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maximum point awarded to any particular risk component is pre-set (see Table 3) and depends 
on the relevance of that component to the overall risk of a country. To ensure consistency, both 
between countries and over time, the ICRG editors assign these points on the basis of a series of 
pre-set questions for each risk component (PRS, 2014). 
The ICRG provides monthly and annual political risk index for 166 countries by 
assigning risk points to each of the twelve components. High total risk points indicate lower risk, 
while low risk points signify higher risk. Composite political risk for each country is classified 
into the distinct bands below to indicate level of risk: 
 Band one: Very-Low Risk (80% – 100%) 
 Band two: Low-Risk (70% – 79.9%) 
 Band three: Moderate Risk (60%– 69.9%) 
 Band Four: High Risk (50% – 59.9%) 
 Band Five: Very-High Risk (0.0% – 49.9%) 
 
Quantitative data on FDI inflow into the Nigerian telecommunication industry, from 2002 to 
2011, were used to generate tables and graphs as used in Howell (2007) to help establish trends 
analysed alongside quantified ICRG political risk data over the same period. The analysis was in 
two parts: First, composite political risk data (independent variables) involving the 12 
components are presented alongside Nigeria’s FDI net inflow figures (dependent variable) for 
the study period to determine the overall effect of political risk on FDI. To evaluate trends 
further, annual political risk percentage changes are calculated and compared to annual net FDI 
inflow percentage changes for each year over the study period.  Second, correlations between all 
variables are generated. Particular emphasis is given to the relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables and these are ranked accordingly. Political risk components that 
correlated significantly with Net Telecoms FDI inflow were then analysed, via multiple 
backward regression to evaluate the extent to which significant variables can explain net FDI 
inflow. In line with the ICRG data, this analysis takes into consideration the fact that increases in 
the risk component points over a period signify the lowering of political risk.  
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Data Presentation and Discussion of Findings 
From Table 4, the composite political risk rating for Nigeria during the period 2002 to 2011 
ranged from 38.79 to 46. This means that the most favourable risk rating Nigeria achieved within 
the period is 46 per cent, recorded in 2006 and 2011. This risk level falls within the very high 
risk ranking of the ICRG. However, there is notable and sustained improvement as most of the 
years witnessed positive percentage changes. Arguably, the improvement could have resulted 
from the introduction and sustainability of multi-party democracy; Nigeria is enjoying its longest 
uninterrupted period of multi-party democracy since independence in 1960. The highest decline 
(-4.72) occurred in 2007; an election year in Nigeria. Election years in most of SSA can often be 
characterised by increased political risks which create uncertainties for investors because 
changes in governments results in policy changes which can subsequently affect investment 
contracts. From Table 5, FDI net inflow ranged from $848 Million in year 2002 to $1,483Million 
in year 2011. FDI grew to its highest level of $3,057million in year 2009, but reduced in the two 
succeeding years. Year 2002 to 2003 witnessed an improvement in the political risk rating from 
38.79 to 41.54, representing a 7.09 per cent positive movement while FDI net inflows for the 
same period grew by 97.40 per cent. This is depicted in Figures 1 and 2.  
The net percentage change in the political risk rating over the period 2002 to 2011 was 
17.75 per cent meaning a reduction in the risk level in the country by that margin whilst FDI 
grew by 154.70 per cent, within the same period. This may be interpreted to mean that lower 
levels of political risk encouraged the inflow of FDI into the Nigerian telecommunication sector. 
This effect is considered significant as only 17.75 per cent change in political risk index led to 
154.70 per cent change in FDI net inflows. This result is consistent with the findings of Asiedu 
(2002), Busse and Hefeker (2007), Baek and Qian (2011), Bussman (2010) and Hayakawa et al. 
(2011). Even though Nigeria’s political risk rating is considered high the observed improvements 
warranted an increase in FDI inflow. Irrespective of political risk rating, even below 50% 
(considered high risk), consistent improvements are favourable signals to foreign investors.  
General overview of the data indicates that some variables either remain constant or 
experience minimal change over the period. These include socio-economic conditions, 
corruption, military in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions and bureaucracy quality. 
Bureaucracy quality, for example, seemingly, remained the same throughout the study period; 
indicating that, in some cases, the individual variations may not adequately explain FDI inflow.  
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Table 4 ICRG Political Risk Components Dataset for Nigeria (2002 – 2011) 
 Political Risk Components 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Government Stability 6.88 7.63 7.79 7.92 7.92 7.00 7.17 7.96 7.54 8.00 
Socio-economic Conditions 1.67 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.54 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Investment Profile 4.54 4.04 4.50 4.88 6.13 6.00 6.04 6.50 6.50 6.50 
Internal Conflict 4.58 6.13 7.42 6.50 6.17 5.67 5.58 6.17 6.58 6.50 
External Conflict 11.08 10.58 10.00 10.00 10.00 9.67 9.21 9.50 9.50 9.50 
Corruption 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.33 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Military in Politics 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.67 2.00 
Religion in Politics 0.50 1.42 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.96 1.50 1.50 1.50 
Law and Order 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.67 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Ethnic Tensions 1.00 1.58 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 
Democratic Accountability 3.04 3.17 3.00 3.42 3.79 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 
Bureaucracy Quality 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Total 38.79 41.54 43.71 44.21 46.00 43.83 43.50 45.63 45.29 46.00 
Annual Percentage Change 0.00 7.09 5.22 1.14 4.05 -4.72 -0.75 4.9 -0.75 1.57 
Source: Extracted from PRS International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Researchers’ Dataset (2013) 
 
Table 5 FDI net inflows into the Nigeria Telecommunications Industry (2002 – 2011) 
Indicator Name 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Nigeria Telecomm FDI net inflows 
(US $M) 
848 1,674 1,070 2,312 2,535 2,761 2,995 3,057 3,036 1,483 
Annual % Change 0.00 97.40 -36.08 116.07 9.65 8.91 8.49 2.07 -0.69 -51.12 
Sources: World Bank (2013) and Nigeria Bureau of Statistics 
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Figure 1 Percentage Change in Political Components and FDI (2002 to 2011) 
 
 
Figure 2 Percentage Change in Political Components and FDI (2002 to 2011) 
 
 
FDI Inflow and Individual Political Risk Components  
To evaluate the relationships further we generate correlation and regression results with the aim 
of ordering the importance of the variables. Table 6 depicts the relationship between all variables 
with particular focus on the relationship between net telecommunications FDI inflow (dependent 
variable) and the political risk component variables (independent variables). The relationships 
between all the variables, including composite political risk have also been shown in Table 6. 
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Table 6 Correlation Matrix Net FDI Flow and Political Risk Components 
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Government 
Stability 
7.58 0.421 1              
2. Socio-economic 
Conditions 
1.67 0.233 0.275 1             
3. Investment 
Profile 
5.56 0.962 0.176 0.620 1            
4. Internal    
Conflict 
6.13 0.750 0.753* 0.092 0.050 1           
5. External  
Conflict 
9.90 0.567 -0.275 -0.365 -0.797** -0.397 1          
6. Corruption 
 
1.33 0.236 0.184 0.406 0.941** 0.042 -0.823** 1         
7. Military in 
Politics 
1.97 0.104 0.034 -0.496 -0.342 -0.211 0.250 -0.249 1        
8. Religion in 
Politics 
1.64 0.475 0.368 -0.390 0.242 0.598 -0.628 0.432 0.102 1       
9. Law and  
Order 
1.82 0.241 0.120 .451 0.971** 0.005 -0.817** 0.978** -0.266 0.366 1      
10. Ethnic  
Tensions 
1.86 0.329 0.546 0.106 0.583 0.698* -0.869** 0.677* -0.152 0.875** 0.630 1     
11. Democratic 
Accountability 
3.39 0.246 0.294 0.206 0.808** 0.030 -0.630 0.916** -0.154 0.467 0.886** 0.611 1    
12.Bureaucracy 
Quality 
1.00 0.000 
b b
 
b
 
b
 
b
 
b
 
b
 
b
 
b
 
b
 
b
 
b
   
13. Composite 
Political Risk 
43.85 2.253 0.694* 0.383 0.752* 0.631 -0.801** 0.773** -0.225 0.650* 0.743* 0.904** 0.752* 
b
 1  
14. Net Telecoms 
FDI Inflow 
(Nigeria) 
2177.10 842.96 .055 0.186 0.690* .025 -0.718* 0.809** -0.358 0.481 0.779** .617 0.763* 
b
 0.578 1 
Correlation Rank   10 9 5 11 4 1 8 7 2 6 3    
*p<0.05; **p<0.01(2-tailed);  
b Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant 
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Table 7 Political Risk Component and FDI Flow: Backward Multiple Regression of Significant Variables 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Corruption  0.774 0.760 0.880 1.391 0.809** 
Investment Profile -1.069 -1.060 -1.027 -0.618  
Law and Order 0.909 0.900 0.916   
External Conflict -0.198 -0.202    
Democratic Accountability -0.012     
      
R
2
 0.729 0.729 0.716 0.699 0.655 
Adjusted R
2
 0.391 0.512 0.574 0.612 0.611 
The entries for the variables are the standardised Beta Coefficients 
**p<0.01(2-tailed) 
 
The variable Bureaucracy Quality as shown in Table 6 could not be computed because the 
variable remained constant over the study period. Net telecommunications FDI inflow correlates 
positively with Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Investment Profile, Internal 
Conflict, Corruption, Religion in Politics, Law and Order, Ethnic Tensions, and Democratic 
Accountability. However, the relationship between FDI inflow and External Conflict and 
Military in Politics is negative. Table 6 also ranks all the variables and indicates significance 
with the aim of ordering the importance of each political risk component to explaining FDI 
inflow. The variables with significant results are ranked as follows: (1) Corruption (0.809), (2) 
Law and Order (0.779), (3) Democratic Accountability (0.763), (4) External Conflict (-0.718), 
and (5) Investment Profile (0.690). This could be interpreted that, separately, with the exception 
of the external conflict variable, when all the significant variables increase (risk reduces) FDI 
inflow could also increase.  
Contrary to expectation, when the external conflict variable reduces (risk increases) FDI 
inflow increases. Although the evident trend of reduction in the score of the external conflict 
variable over the period is small it does appear to influence FDI inflow positively. On one hand, 
this trend could have resulted from a relative increase in one of the subcomponents (war, cross-
border conflict, foreign pressures). According to the PRS group’s evaluation, the external 
conflict variable assesses the risk to the incumbent government from foreign action, ranging 
from non-violent to violent external pressure.  Perhaps this change in the variable could have 
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resulted from external diplomatic pressures or sanctions rather than cross-border conflicts or war. 
It could also be argued that, in the telecommunications sector, non-violent external pressures do 
not significantly influence the expansion of operations. Also, in the event of cross-border 
conflicts, planned expansion into neighbouring countries are postponed, thereby prompting 
further expansion in the existing market. Although further research is required to strengthen this 
argument, it is plausible, in the Nigerian case, because of the relative large market size compared 
to neighbouring countries. In this regard, external pressures or conflicts were likely to benefit the 
larger economy. As expected, variable increase (risk reduction) for corruption, law and order, 
democratic accountability and investment profile increase FDI inflow. Reduced corruption gives 
an extra incentive to foreign firms to invest more because of the likelihood of improved returns 
on investment. 
Backward multiple regressions of the variables with significant results from the 
correlation matrix in Table 6 together revealed that only corruption generated a significant result 
as shown in Table 7. The R Square value of 0.655 is also an important result because it means 
that over 65% of FDI inflow into the Nigerian telecommunications sector is explained by 
corruption alone. This confirms that by reducing corruption alone, this would increase Nigeria’s 
telecommunications FDI inflow tremendously.  
 
Conclusion and Implications 
This study investigated the influence of political risk on the attraction of FDI into developing 
economies in Africa with Nigeria telecommunications industry as the case study. We identified 
the various components of political risk and explored their aggregate and individual impacts on 
the inflow of FDI into Nigeria’s telecommunications industry between 2002 and 2011. Our 
findings show that, in general, reducing the level of political risk (independent variable) resulted 
in increased FDI net inflows (dependent variable) into the Nigerian telecommunications industry. 
The study also observed that Nigeria’s political risk rating improved over the study period from 
38.79 per cent in 2002 to 46 per cent in 2011 resulting in growth in net FDI inflow. This implies 
that political risk had a significant impact on the flow of FDI into the industry. Although Nigeria 
remained a country with a very high political risk rating (highest rating of 46%) over the period, 
the improvements were enough to attract huge net telecommunications FDI inflows.  
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Our study also indicates that the various political risk components affect FDI in different 
ways. It was found that reducing the risk with respect to corruption, law and order, democratic 
accountability and investment profile were important in influencing FDI inflow. Our findings 
emphasise the importance of reducing corruption to enhance foreign investment. This means that 
SSA countries, such as Nigeria, need to appreciate the importance of tackling the canker of 
corruption to improve FDI inflow which is intrinsically linked to economic growth. Considering 
the important role FDI plays in the economic growth of developing nations (World Bank, 2013), 
and the fact that most economic determinants of FDI such as the availability of natural resources 
and large domestic markets are not within the control of governments (Baek and Qian, 2011), 
this paper recommends that for developing countries to be globally competitive for scarce FDI, 
their governments should endeavour to promote favourable business environments to attract 
MNEs. Based on our findings, the pertinent issues that need immediate attention must 
encompass tackling corruption in unison with improving law and order, democratic 
accountability, and investment profile. With regards to corruption, there is an urgent need for the 
provision of strong and independent anti-corruption institutions that can foster an improvement 
in transparency within both the public and private sectors. It is important that these processes can 
also ensure full independence and efficiency of the judiciary which will give added confidence to 
foreign investors that redress can be objectively sought in the law courts. Particularly, the PRS 
Group emphasise the need to control excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservation, exchange of 
favours, secret funding of political parties, and questionable close ties between business and 
politics. These tendencies would not only contribute to potential instability but have the tendency 
to increase long-term perceived host country political risk which is detrimental to FDI inflow. 
Law and order, according to the PRS group, relates to the strength and impartiality of the 
legal system which must be supported by a general observance of the law. Democratic 
accountability, related to how responsive governments are to their people, is also crucial. SSA 
governments need to be accountable to their electorates to enhance their attractiveness to foreign 
investors. With investment profile, in line with the subcomponents, it is important that 
governments in SSA need to avoid payment delays, improve contract viability, eliminate 
expropriation tendencies, as well as allow profit repatriation, to reduce general political risk and 
therefore improve FDI attraction. Arguably, good governance and institutional arrangements are 
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key to enhancing FDI inflow to Africa; there is an absolute need to continuously work towards 
improving these. 
Our contribution highlights that, irrespective of the political risk rating, consistent 
improvement in the rating serves as a good signal to foreign investor location decision making. 
We also contribute further to the international business literature by ranking the potential risk 
components to stress their respective importance in explaining FDI inflow. Out study, for 
example, shows that corruption explains over 65% of FDI inflow into the Nigerian 
telecommunications industry. This study is also exemplified by attempting to suggest that the 
impact of political risk components vary from sector to sector as some components react to FDI 
inflow in different ways.  
Despite our contributions, this study acknowledges the limitations of our approach. 
Firstly, our study focused on only one sector, in one country, in SSA. Further studies covering a 
wider range of sectors and countries in SSA, collectively or comparatively, could enrich our 
understanding of the influence of political risk components on FDI inflow. Secondly, a study that 
is able to explore subcomponents would be needed to explain their influences on FDI inflow 
independently. Such an approach could help to explain each subcomponent’s contribution to FDI 
inflow, positively or negatively, more clearly than the main component.  
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